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Forever Overhead: Pakistan

Forever Overhead: Pakistan

Drones, reactors, floods, and Usama bin Laden’s Google Earth debut–and you don’t have to work for a covert agency to see (most of) them…

Drones
The official US position on drone strikes in Pakistan is that they are “cross-border”, i.e. launched from bases in Afghanistan. However, Google Earth images obtained in 2009 by Pakistan’s The News and The London Times clearly showed Predator drones at Shamsi airfield North of Quetta. Denials were more pointed after an unwitting “outing”/mistake by Senator Feinstein when she said at a hearing (also in 2009), “As I understand it, these are flown out of a Pakistani base”. Her office attempted to walk the utterance back as well.

The aircraft are of course no longer visible on Google Earth, though new structures have since appeared. Ogleearth has a fairly enjoyable speculation and wonderment-rich post on the provenance of the images.

New America Foundation maintains a marvelous visualization/Google Maps mashup of drone strikes on Pakistani territory, with all available supplemental data on location/combatant vs. civilian casualties, etc. 2004-present.

Our study shows that the 244 reported drone strikes in northwest Pakistan, including 31 in 2011, from 2004 to the present have killed approximately between 1,493 and 2,379 individuals, of whom around 1,200 to 1,908 were described as militants in reliable press accounts. Thus, the true non-militant fatality rate since 2004 according to our analysis is approximately 20 percent. In 2010, it was more like five percent. [As of May 27, 2011]

The Nuclear Program
Newsweek recently reported on discoveries made by examining commercially-obtained imagery of the Khushab site. The images show construction (circa April 2011) of a fourth reactor for plutonium production (via reprocessing).

Not only does this represent expansion of the program itself, but also points to yet another track for the production of nuclear material. Heretofore (really, circa 10-15 years ago) the putatively prodigious output of Pakistan’s production had been based on Highly Enriched Uranium (HEU) created in the enrichment process stolen, mastered, refined and in addition sold (sometimes in “turnkey” fashion including not just plans and the like but access to networks of businessmen who could illicitly provide the makings of similar programs)–thanks to the strikingly James Bond-bad guy-like A.Q. Khan–to a rogue’s gallery of countries including North Korea, Iran (where the P-1 became the Ir-1), and Libya (which, fortunately, “came clean” and sent its centrifuges to Tennessee, where good use is apparently being made of them–I imagine at more than one point in the last month or so the Colonel has been wondering if his short-lived return from pariah status was worth it).

Now, Pakistan’s diversification from just HEU into plutonium isn’t news, but again, the high points here are the pace of expansion and, the ostensibly public nature of the imagery and discovery (though seriously, one has to wonder how closely they were led to acquire imagery at this particular time from this particular site, and by whom).

I’m not going to belabor the plausibility and nuances of the “nightmare scenario” of loose (or acquisition-abetted) nukes at this point, but I will link to Sanger/Broad’s NYT article about US efforts to assist Pakistan in securing their arsenal, going so far as to offer assistance in developing PALs (Permissive Action Links–basically, as close as you will get to the real-life version of what are colloquially referred to as “launch codes” in popular culture). One interesting International Law nuance here is the question of whether giving PALs (or even assisting in the development of the technology) to a NPT non-signatory is a violation of our obligations under article 1 of said treaty.

Darn it, I was looking to some more canonical source, but the Wikipedia entry on PALs is pretty good.

Floods
Courtesy of NASA we have some astonishing imagery which brings home the scope of destruction of the 2010 flooding in the districts around the Indus River. Despite being a “show, don’t tell” advocate, the stats are hard to resist.

  • Approximately 1800 killed, BUT ~20 MILLION impacted
  • 1.5M displaced
  • 1.89M homes destroyed
  • An estimated $500 million crop damage (and of course let’s remember that you needn’t be anywhere near the vicinity of the flooding to be impacted by the absence of the food derived from those crops)
  • 5.3M jobs lost or attenuated, total economic impact estimated $43B; Pakistan’s GDP dropped or will bottom out 6-9% lower (obviously, taking us well into negative growth)

One unfortunately strategic beneficiary might be the Tehrik-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP, AKA “The Pakistani Taliban”), as they were able to provide assistance where the government couldn’t; this affords them a source of legitimacy they don’t normally pursue, more in the manner of Hizbullah in Southern Lebanon (which provides civil services there in absence–sometimes ensuring it–of the government; this is why you may sometimes hear Southern Lebanon referred to as “a state within a state”). As a result we have “inverse counterinsurgency” and a can count a strengthened TTP as one result of the floods. Also, government forces were distracted from their counter-TTP efforts by the floods.

Usama bin Laden Makes the Google Earth Scene
Some will remember a prior Contours of Catastrophe post musing about the familiarity of the outline of bin Laden’s compound. Well, the entrenchment of the shape and relevance of Google Earth continues apace–per geography.pk:

A milestone, all thanks to Bin Laden’s death perhaps that Google has “pre-announced” satellite imagery update for first time ever. This imagery update as expected includes the updated imagery for Abbottabad town of Pakistan that has gained attentions in recent days.

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Obama, Rhetoric and “The 1967 Borders”

Obama, Rhetoric and “The 1967 Borders”

 

“The 1967 Borders”

It’s easy to imagine that the Obama and Netanyahu tit-for-tat was deliberate and–on the part of at least one of the parties–very calculating.

I’d first started writing just after Obama’s first Middle East/North Africa (MENA)-Israel/Palestine speech, but then came Netanyahu’s Oval Office display, where he erected his straw-golem before our eyes, and before I reluctantly commented on that, Obama’s AIPAC address closed the rhetorical circle for that round.

The Obama Speech

Though my first thoughts after the speech were more about MENA than Israel/Palestine, clearly that rhetorical loop has since colored this germinal event. Regarding Israel/Palestine, my main reaction to the central point (yet so often misrepresented, most egregiously by Mr. Bibi himself) was that it was refreshing to hear the formulation articulated by the President in that context; namely, Israeli/Palestinian land swaps with the pre-’67 borders as a starting point. Of course, the use of the phrase, “1967 borders” ensured a reaction from Netanyahu.

Associated Press

The borders of Israel and Palestine should be based on the 1967 lines with mutually agreed swaps.

Still, the important part of this phrase is the caveat, “mutually agreed swaps”. And no, BTW, this is not a shift in US policy, not even a “subtle” one.

Netanyahu’s Oval Office Display

After recovering from the initial logical shock, my first thoughts were that the confluence of MENA events, the Hamas/Fatah unity deal, and the looming UN vote have left Netanyahu in a bit of a state. Though let me be clear, the possibility of a new Egyptian regime reneging on the Camp David accords, and the regional implications of a regime capable of this are–however unlikely–worthy of concern. Netanyahu clearly does not agree with the Preaident that the time is ripe and we all risk getting “on the wrong side of history” if we don’t return to the table now.

Wikimedia Commons

The AIPAC Speech

Now Obama’s canniness begins to clarify. Having anticipated Netanyahu’s obdurate attempt to humiliate him, he restates his case in a sort of counter-obduracy, and somehow doing so in front of AIPAC has more force than doing so in front of Netanyahu, because while the latter will go as will Obama, the American-Israel lobby will endure (though its character may–or that of American Zionism may–change). Thus he makes it clear that his position isn’t changing; or not, at least, without some concessions from Israel. This would be potent stuff, a potential act of “speaking truth to power” save for the fact that he undermines the force of this position by making it clear that US support for Israel (i.e. the “ironclad” bond) isn’t actually contingent on any movement. Still, it looks like by closing this loop the pressure on Netanyahu exceeds that of what would be on Obama.

Mr. Bibi Goes to Congress (Reuters)

 

Favorite Speeches, Rhetoric, and Porn

Before the furore, my intention was to use the speech as a pretext to hold forth on substance “versus” rhetoric (they’re not mutually exclusive of course). Before citing a few of my favorite Obama speeches, I first wanted to quote Mark Danner’s marvelous meta-speech to graduating students from Berkeley’s Department of Rhetoric (hence the meta):

There is a sense, I’m afraid, that being invited to deliver The Speech to students of Rhetoric is akin to being asked out for a romantic evening by a porn star: Whatever prospect you might have of pleasure is inevitably dampened by performance anxiety — the suspicion that your efforts, however enthusiastic, will inevitably be judged according to stern professional standards.

It’s really quite a speech, and no so meta- nor amusing as that. It’s about war, politics and society. Quite stunning and recommended.

And moving forward, a few favorite Obama speeches in reverse-chronological order.

The Tucson Memorial (The Gabby Giffords Speech)
Marvelous. The President takes a horrific event, contextualizes it, and President takes a horrific event, contextualizes it, and turns it into a frame Americans can rally to.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=ztbJmXQDIGA[/youtube]

The Victory Speech
It’s a shame so many would be so surprised that this would be a farewell to pure soaring “yes we can” rhetoric–sadly, one has to govern as well as inspire. If the Obama presidency were Pet Sounds, this would be “Wouldn’t It Be Nice”.

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=jJfGx4G8tjo[/youtube]

The Reverend Wright Speech
Not only does candidate Obama distance himself from Wright and the related controversy, but reframes the whole debacle as a call to American transcendence of the ideological and institutional bigotry that inheres despite the great civil right progress we so proudly tout. Shame on you, pundits and chattering class!

[youtube]http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=zzgVy6Mj2Bw[/youtube]

In closing, I’ll return to the Danner:

Contingency, accidents, the metaphysical ironies that seem to stitch history together like a lopsided quilt — all these have no place in the imperial vision. A perception of one’s self as “history’s actor” leaves no place for them. But they exist and it is invariably others, closer to the ground, who see them, know them, and suffer their consequences.

 

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International Sport(s), Geopolitics, and Political Histrionics

International Sport(s), Geopolitics, and Political Histrionics

Prime Ministers Manmohan Singh and Yousuf Raza Gilani attended a semi-final match in the cricket World Cup today, the latest in a a 25-year series of events giving rise to the charming phrase, “cricket diplomacy”.  The seminal event  took place in 1987 when a match served as the pretext for what ended up being a somewhat decisive meeting between Zia-ul Haq and Rajiv Gandhi at one of the heights of tension in Kashmir.

Reuters

And as an aside, the captain of the Pakistani team, Imran Khan, has since turned politician and and is a Pakistani MP, albeit a bit of a milquetoast-y one (there’s no shortage of course, not anywhere).

Speaking of pretexts and geopolitical histrionics, watch the daily “retreat ceremony” at Wagah on the Kashmiri border:

Let’s not forget the substantial role sport(s) plays in geopolitics: FIFA is, after all, the 2nd largest international organization (by number of member states)–only UN has more. But this topic is covered at some length.

And speaking of pretexts, I’ll take the opportunity to also remember that Kashmir isn’t solely contested by India and Pakistan: China has a stake too. It also has a spot of Muslim separatism (though not entirely–Xinjiang is semi-autonomous).

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Rebels Take Ajdabiya: What Happens Next?

Rebels Take Ajdabiya: What Happens Next?

So the Libyan rebels have taken control of Ajdabiya. Where celebration in Benghazi might have been more about  mere survival, this is a strategic victory.

Earlier on Friday, western warplanes bombed Gaddafi’s tanks and artillery outside the town to try to break a battlefield stalemate and help rebels retake the strategic area.

Coordination with the Rebels
Despite claims to the contrary, the seizure of Ajdabiya represents some degree of coordination between the coalition air forces and the rebels on the ground. Clearly, this is already “no-fly zone ‘plus'”; the targets were ground forces, not aircraft or air defenses, and the result clearly  went well beyond protecting “civilians”.

If you align Obama’s express political goals (among them the ouster of Qaddafi) with the strategic objectives of the coalition (albeit without much coherence, so I’m guessing) and frame them under the rubric off UNSC 1973, then you should be coordinating the actions in the air with those on the ground. I have to believe there’s some covert tactical intelligence-sharing between the air and the rebels, and that this allows us to advise them directly as opposed to some passive relationship where we “soften” targets and merely hope those actions nudge them in the right direction. While the rebels must at least consolidate in the East first, it’s a long way to Tripoli from there.

“Fleeing” v. Retreating
But it would be premature to celebrate as far as strategic military objectives are concerned. This isn’t so much a case of Qaddafi’s army “fleeing” as it is strategic prudence. Ajdabiya as it is probably more a concession of territory in order to retreat to closer and more fortified areas West. Qaddafi’s supply lines were strained and given the topography, an easy target for coalition air power. Things are going to get much more difficult as the rebels push West and approach more Qaddafi friendly/fortified territory, as the action closes in to more densely-packed areas (making for less effective “close air support” from the coalition and greater danger of civilian collateral damage) and the rebels’ supply lines become stretched as the loyalists consolidate. Sirte may prove determinative in this regard.

The rebels are being armed; we’re apparently looking the other way. Given that for us there are substantial legal questions over whether we could even arm any group within Libya, perhaps this is appropriate. Were the rebels able to get to Tripoli though (or even Sirte or Misrate), a few JDAM designators wouldn’t hurt.

After Qaddafi
What happens in Libya after Qaddafi? The people of Libya need basic services, at an absolute minimum “law and order” (then hospitals, water, power, etc.).  What security institutions will survive a post-Qaddafi Libya? In Egypt we had a relatively independent and strong military, relatively respected by the people. In Libya we may be stuck with a military made up of loyalist elites (at least, those who haven’t been persuaded to leave) and mercenaries (whose primary loyalty is to payment). Libya’s never been a “nation”, so primary loyalties (tribe) could leave a vacuum for more malign actors where security is absent.

Which brings us to the next point to consider in reconstructing a state: it needs to make money. And 95% of Libya’s export money comes from oil. That’s a single point of failure: Libya normally produces ~ 1.8 million barrels/day. Rebels are reestablishing production, but the numbers they’re talking about are in the hundreds of thousands of barrels/day. And of course, they need to establish ad-hoc export deals under their own authority for the time being. Apparently, the Transitional National Council (TNC) has established a deal with Qatar to take shipments of the oil and market it on behalf of the TNC.

As far as the consideration “it’s a long way to Tripoli”, those strategic objectives of regime change (or “regime disposal”) can’t entirely depend on the rebels, and a regional partition (say, East Libya and West Libya) is unsustainable, especially considering that the major oil fields and infrastructure are in the East. This scenario is similar to Iraqi Kurdistan, where a nation within a state is largely autonomous (having an independent military, a president, etc.) except when authority over a particularly oil-rich region (i.e., Kirkuk) comes into question. Again, there’s the simple fact that the there’s a pretty broad consensus that the de-facto head of state of “West Libya” “has to go”.

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Blood for No Oil

Blood for No Oil

Actually, this post doesn’t have anything–directly–to do with the title, I just always wanted to use it. James Howard Kunstler used it as a joke referring to the oft-lofted anti-war poster, pointing at the time (probably 2003) to the immediate huge drop in Iraqi oil production at the beginning of the war, which I might add took years to come even close to where it had been. Those who know me know references to US policy in the Middle East being “all about oil” is nails->chalkboard for me (it’s not entirely unfounded, just a better beginning to a conversation than the ending it’s often treated as). So…

US Oil Production and Consumption
The US produces a lot of petroleum, actually (we’re the world’s 3rd-largest producer at 11%; we export about 2 million barrels/day), but we consume even more. About 51% (2009) of US consumption comes from foreign sources (18.8 million barrels/day in 2009). EIA projections have that coming down to 45% in 2035. By the way, some refining processes actually increase the volume of refined output (a not inconsiderable amount–1 Mbpd in 2007)–the increased volume is actually counted as domestic production regardless of where the crude came from!

Where US Oil Comes From (and Where it Doesn’t)
About 1/2 of our imported oil comes from the Western Hemisphere (i.e., not the Middle East–about 17% comes from the Persian Gulf). The top five sources for US oil (the middle three do switch positions from year to year):

  • Canada (21% gross)
  • Mexico (10% gross)
  • Venezuela (9% gross)
  • Saudi Arabia (9% gross)
  • Nigeria (7% gross)

What “Sweet, Light Crude” Means
“Lightness” refers to the American Petroleum Institute’s measure of the gravity of crude relative to that of water.  The scale goes from light to heavy; most grades fall between 10-70 “degrees”, though Canada’s oil sands output is very heavy, ~8 degrees.

“Sweetness” refers to the sulfur content of the crude; <5% sulfur is considered “sweet”, anything more is considered “sour”.

Where Oil Prices Come From
West Texas Intermediate is the main benchmark for oil coming into the US. It’s sourced in Texas and mainly consumed internally. Its price is usually about $1-2 lower than the price of Brent Crude.

When you hear reports about the price of a barrel of oil, it probably is referring to the price of Brent Crude. Brent is the main global benchmark; lower- and higher-quality crudes may be “pegged” to the price of Brent. It’s sourced mainly in the North Sea, and consumed largely by Europe. There a a few “flavors” of Brent:

  • Brent Sweet Light Crude
  • Oseburg
  • Ekofisk
  • Forties

Dubai Crude is another benchmark, particularly for the sale of oil going to Asia. This is sourced in Dubai (and Oman), and exported/refined externally.

There’s also the OPEC Reference Basket–this is a weighted average from ~11 sources. A more nuanced way of managing oil prices (beyond brute-force supply variation) is controlling the output from one source relative to the others.

Those are the main benchmark grades. You can get an idea of the variability of grades (which vary from field to field–sometimes widely) by looking at this chart of sources and grades.

Iran
Iran Heavy is pegged to Brent. Because of its lower quality, it usually sells about $6 less than Brent. I mention this because we talk a lot about Iran’s oil production (they are the world’s 5th-largest producer), and the geopolitical implications, especially in light of the UN sanctions.

Iran actually suffers a bit–even when oil prices rise–not just because of the sanctions, but because the crude is heavy and sour, and thus more expensive to refine (and can’t be processed in as many refineries). Refineries are expensive to build and maintain, and not as flexible in processing various grades as you might think. They export much of their crude, and even for internal consumption end up importing gasoline.

Iran had actually been “hoarding” crude in 10-28 Very Large Crude Carriers (VLCCs) for several years. No one says exactly why, but it’s a lot of oil they’re storing–a big VLCC can hold about 2 Million barrels. They’re also very expensive to maintain, insure, and rent. I last speculated with a friend on why that was in 2008, wondering about efforts to constrain world supply and benefit financially, but they’re still there (though I don’t mean to overstate–there is some movement out of Iran, but they are always storing). And there are more of them.

Beijing Lu International Freight Forwarders Limited

Despite the sanctions, a lot goes to China, and one might assume that they benefit from tightening (but not ceased) supply from Libya. And Europe, too:

But since Iranian sanctions were tightened, the biggest trade for NITC’s tankers have involved shipments of Iranian crude for NIOC to Ain Sukhna. From there, crude is pumped to the Sidi Kerir terminal on Egypt’s Mediterranean coast, where it is blended with other Middle East crudes. From Sidi Kerir, crude is sold to traders based in the Mediterranean, with the biggest volumes going to Italy, Spain and to Turkey.

And Iran recently reduced its domestic subsidies for gasoline, provoking some violence, a huge spike in gas prices (obviously), apparently showing signs of bite from the sanctions.

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